A plea for action on Zimbabwe by South Africa and Germany
by David Coltart
The current situation
In his book Development as Freedom, the Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen stresses the causal connection between democracy and the absence of famine. He makes the point that there has never been a famine in the recorded history of any country which has a free press, to support the claim that a free press and an active opposition constitute the best early warning system a country threatened by famine can have. In other words, the failure or non-existence of democracy usually results in economic collapse, and that in turn invariably leads to such humanitarian catastrophes as famine.
The destruction of democracy, weak as it already was, in Zimbabwe since 2000 has been well documented. In 2000 Zimbabwe had a unique opportunity, which it squandered, to build a national consensus on a new constitution. Since then there has been a rapid decline into increasingly authoritarian rule. The implosion of the Zimbabwean economy has followed. The country now has hyperinflation and is rated the fastest-declining economy in the world. The death of democracy and economic collapse have together resulted in a humanitarian crisis of unimaginable proportions.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) recently reported that people living in Zimbabwe now have the lowest life expectancy in the world. Since 1994 the average life expectancy for women in Zimbabwe has fallen from 57 to 34, and for men from 54 to 37. The WHO believes that life expectancy rates will continue to fall. It is estimated that some 3 500 people die every week in Zimbabwe through the deadly combination of Aids, poverty and malnutrition. To put that in a global context, a recent report stated that some 700 people a week were dying in Iraq. Another publication said that some 400 000 people have died in Darfur since 2003: this can be compared with the estimate that about 600 000 Zimbabweans have died during the same period.
According to findings released in October 2006 by the Zimbabwe Demographic Health Survey (ZDHS), child mortality in the country has nearly doubled, rising from 59 per 1 000 live births in 1985 (five years after Zimbabwe gained independence) to 102 per 1 000 live births in 1999. The under-five mortality rate has continued to rise, with 129 per 1 000 in 2004, according to United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) figures. The situation has become more grave since 2004, when the economy plummeted further. An additional factor that might be expected to increase mortality rates is that in 2006 the Mugabe regime forcibly displaced 700 000 people. According to a UN report, a great number of these were children. Accordingly it is safe to assume that child mortality rates have risen sharply since 2004.
These shocking facts are the result of the unique convergence of three factors in Zimbabwe: the Aids pandemic and the government’s failure to address it; severe economic decline; and high levels of malnutrition, which the government refuses to acknowledge. These factors are dealt with separately in the sections that follow.
Aids and the Zimbabwean government’s failure to deal with the pandemic
In a report released in June 2006 by James Morris, the Director of the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN stated that Zimbabwe has one of the highest incidences of HIV/Aids in the world. Southern Africa is in fact the epicentre of the global pandemic. Nine of the 10 countries with the highest levels of infection in the world are to be found in Southern Africa. Zimbabwe is one of them.
What makes Aids particularly life-threatening in Zimbabwe is the fact that the government has dedicated the bulk of its dwindling resources to maintaining its hold on power, instead of providing the antiretroviral (ARV) drugs necessary to combat the disease. It is estimated that only a tiny fraction of those people suffering from HIV/Aids are on regular courses of medication. Mugabe’s regime prefers spending money on keeping its own people at bay to saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens. In the 2006 budget an amount equivalent to 12.5% of the total allocation for health was awarded to Zimbabwe’s equivalent of Stasi, the Central Intelligence Organisation. On top of this, the share allocated to the military was greater than that for health. This trend in the government’s thinking is underlined by its recent announcement that it is about to import new military aircraft from China. This is defence spending in a country which is not at war, and which is surrounded by friendly states.
The fastest-shrinking economy in the world
The results of the Zimbabwe government’s ruinous policies include destroying the agricultural sector (which prior to 2000 accounted for 40% of Zimbabwe’s foreign exchange earnings and now generates half of that); driving out the country’s best brains, regardless of race; and in the last year destroying the homes and livelihoods of some 700 000 Zimbabweans, The country’s economy is now in free fall. Inflation, according to official (and thus very conservative) government figures, now exceeds 1 200% per annum. Respected economists believe that inflation is more probably in excess of 2 000% per annum. To put this in perspective, the world’s next highest inflation rates are those of Myanmar (Burma) at 70% a year, and Iraq at 40%!
Zimbabwe has suffered five successive years of economic decline. During that period some 3 million Zimbabweans are estimated have gone into economic exile. A high proportion of these have been among the most economically active members of the population. The cream of Zimbabwe’s professional and technical sectors has left, and will not return until there is a political settlement and the reinstatement of the rule of law and democracy.
Over 80% of the Zimbabweans remaining in the country are now unemployed.
The net result for poor people, especially those suffering from HIV/Aids, has been a precipitous fall in their standard of living. They are now unable to afford even the most basic foodstuffs, toiletries and medication. The combination of Aids and poverty has been catastrophic for most of the population.
High levels of malnutrition, and a government which refuses to acknowledge the extent of the problem
In October 2006 the WFP reported that 1.4 million Zimbabweans would need food aid within the six months following, regardless of the crop output of the forthcoming agricultural season. Human rights organisations within Zimbabwe believe that the figure of 1.4 million is a huge underestimation because of the impact of poverty on so many Zimbabweans who are nominally employed. People who previously would have been able to buy food for themselves are no longer able to do so, and millions of urban poor are visibly losing weight. Yet these people are not included in WFP estimates because they are considered to be in employment.
The Zimbabwean government has deliberately downplayed the extent of the crisis over the last few years, for political and propaganda reasons. This compounds the problem. The administration has tried to control the supply of food because in doing so it is able to use food as a political weapon. In this way desperate people, especially in the rural areas, can be coerced into voting for the ruling Zanu-PF party.
Furthermore, if the government were to acknowledge the full extent of the problem, especially in a year (such as 2006) when there have been good rains, that would be tantamount to an admission that the food shortages are a direct result of its chaotic and corrupt land reform programme. This has resulted in highly productive farms being rendered derelict by the government ministers, party operatives, army commanders and judges who have taken them over. Therefore the government consistently refuses to admit the gravity of the problem, and on various occasions in the last few years has been deliberately obstructive towards the WFP and other humanitarian agencies, preventing them from operating freely in Zimbabwe.
In a television interview Mugabe gave in 2004, he said that Zimbabweans did not want to ‘choke’ on international food aid, which they did not need. At the same time NGOs were barred from distributing food, and the government insisted on controlling all food distribution. This policy continued until the March 2005 general elections had been held. The net result was that millions of Zimbabweans over the last few years have been deprived of access to the food supplied by international agencies.
The combination of all of the factors listed above is unique. It is not surprising that Zimbabweans now have the lowest life expectancy in the world. Yet it is
particularly shocking when one remembers that Zimbabwe is not a desert. In 1958 its economy was larger than Singapore’s. Until relatively recently it was the second-largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa. This is not a Liberia or a Somalia. In short this has been a preventable tragedy — and a worse disaster is still preventable. The situation can be turned around within months; hundreds of thousands of lives could be saved and an entire region stabilised.
The world is looking the other way
The Zimbabwean crisis is compounded by the fact that world is showing little interest in the country’s agony. This is attributable to a number of factors. First, although it is arguable that more people are dying in Zimbabwe through the unique combination of factors mentioned above than in Iraq, Afghanistan and Darfur, Zimbabwe hardly rates a mention in the world’s media. Part of the reason is that this is a story that is difficult to film or to write. The country offers very few stark images liekly to capture the world’s attention. A casual visitor to Zimbabwe will not see blood flowing, or many children with kwashiorkor bellies. There are no car bombs. People who die through a combination of Aids, poverty and malnutrition die quietly; they literally fade away. The only means of getting any sense of the extent of the catastrophe is by visiting morgues and cemeteries. These are overflowing. The most poignant evidence of the calamity is to be found in the dates inscribed on headstones and plaques in the cemeteries — the vast majority of people being buried there are young people and children.
Secondly, although they are allowed in Darfur, Afghanistan and Iraq, the foreign media are generally barred from operating in Zimbabwe by the government. There are draconian laws that forbid foreign journalists from working in Zimbabwe without permission, which is rarely given. Journalists are routinely detained in Zimbabwe, and the laws relating to the media prescribe prison terms for those who infringe their stipulations. Media organisations like the BBC and CNN are effectively banned from Zimbabwe. As a result the story of Zimbabwe’s human tragedy is simply not being told. But unless the world’s media put the catastrophe at the top of their agendas, there will be no public pressure on governments elsewhere to take up Zimbabwe as a political cause.
Thirdly, because Zimbabwe has no oil and very few strategic mineral resources, there is no obvious strategic reason why the world powers should want to focus their attention on its troubles. Whilst Zimbabwe does have large reserves of platinum, these are not in sufficiently short supply globally to warrant special attention from the international community. Tragically for Zimbabweans, the only interest that the country’s platinum has aroused internationally is that of the Chinese, who have been prepared to prop up Mugabe’s regime in order to secure privileged access to the mineral.
Fourthly, the response of Southern African governments to the catastrophe unfolding on their doorstep is best described as a state of denial or paralysis.
The net result is that whilst Zimbabwe is arguably the scene of the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis at present, and whilst crimes against humanity have been and are being committed by the government, the world is looking the other way. In doing so it is guaranteeing that the crisis will escalate at a horrifying rate.
Germany and South Africa: a possible solution?
This is not the first time that Zimbabwe has found itself in a critical situation. It faced similar problems in 1976. Then it took the active involvement of the USA and South Africa to break the impasse. Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy resulted in the Rhodesian Front’s finally conceding the principle of majority rule. While that did not yield an immediate settlement of the country’s political dilemma, it at least set in train a process that resulted in intense diplomatic activity and ultimately the Lancaster House agreement, arrived at three years later.
There are two important differences between the present situation and that prevailing in 1976. Firstly, in the mid-seventies South Africa was highly susceptible to Western pressure; and, secondly, the USA and Britain were not engaged in any other wars at the time, and so could focus on Zimbabwe’s affairs. Whilst in the current climate South Africa is under pressure to resolve the crisis (especially because it is starting to hurt its own economy), its leaders have to balance any action they take regarding Zimbabwe against the support the Zanu- PF regime still receives from the majority of Southern African Development Community (SADC) states. For this reason any settlement encouraged by South Africa must enjoy the backing of other major African states.
At present both the USA and Britain are so heavily involved in Iraq and Afghanistan that they simply do not have the capacity to play a meaningful role in the resolution of Zimbabwe’s problems. That position is compounded by the fact that the Zanu-PF regime has successfully persuaded many other African states of the merit of its propaganda line that the USA and Britain are interested only in ‘regime change’ (rather than a democratic process that will culminate in a new constitution and free and fair elections). Accordingly the USA and Britain are not well positioned to engage in regional shuttle diplomacy in Africa.
In the circumstances there are two countries that can make a difference, and should be actively engaged in resolving the crisis. These are South Africa and Germany. The need for South Africa’s involvement is obvious; Germany’s potential role is less so. The latter occupies a unique position in Southern Africa in that it adopted a very strong stance against apartheid, was not Zimbabwe’s colonial master, and has not been involved in the Iraq war. Because of the strong opposition to the Iraq war expressed by many African governments and because of the concerns already mentioned (that the USA or the UK may have a ‘regime change’ agenda for Zimbabwe), the latter can exert only a limited influence on Southern African states. They are therefore unable to encourage them to take a more proactive role in helping to resolve the situation in Zimbabwe.
Germany does not suffer from any such handicap. Furthermore, at present (2007) Germany holds two key international positions which will provide it with an opportunity to act on Zimbabwe. Germany’s presidency of the EU commenced in January 2007, and in July that country will play host to the next G8 summit. Both will provide Chancellor Angela Merkel with important windows of opportunity. A stable Southern Africa (which is now under threat because of the collapse of its second-largest economy) is in the strategic interest of both the EU and the G8. Chancellor Merkel could use her leading roles in both and work vigorously with partner governments in Southern Africa to end the Zimbabwean crisis. Another factor is that Germany has considerable investments in Southern Africa, and in South Africa in particular.
It is in Germany’s interest to do everything possible to secure its own investments in Southern Africa. If the Chancellor is able to play a positive role in resolving the Zimbabwean stalemate she will not only protect existing German investments but create a vast reservoir of goodwill in Southern Africa. This in turn will enhance Germany’s trade and investment prospects in the region in future.
The long-term stability of South Africa depends in large part on its being able to achieve its medium to long-term economic growth targets. These in turn can be met only if medium- to long-term foreign direct investment goals are achieved. If the latter are not met, then South Africa’s growth targets will be missed and the high expectations of black working-class South Africans will be frustrated. This could destabilise South Africa. Furthermore, if South Africa’s economy falters, the entire SADC area will be affected. If that happens, it is inevitable that a region that has taken significant strides towards democracy and economic opening will suffer a setback. This would harm the political and economic security of Southern Africa.
Regrettably, Zimbabwe’s troubles have already had a negative effect on the region. Firstly, because long-term investors fear that South Africa may go the same way as Zimbabwe and replicate its decline into lawlessness and economic collapse, much potential long-term investment in South Africa and adjacent countries has been diverted to other parts of the world. Secondly, as already noted, some 3 million Zimbabweans have gone into economic exile since 2000. The bulk of these people have found homes in South Africa and Botswana. This has not only put additional burdens on those economies, but has driven up the rates of national unemployment and crime in those countries. If Zimbabwe implodes or explodes, the flood of refugees will become a tidal wave. Thirdly, Southern Africa’s inability (or reluctance) to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis has created a negative impression of the entire region in the eyes of international investors, thus retarding even short-term economic growth.
What should South Africa and Germany do?
One of the reasons why relations between the EU and SADC are strained, apparently irreconcilably so, is that the interests of the members of both bodies are too diverse to make it possible to establish a consensus about what should be done, and what policy adopted, to settle the Zimbabwean crisis. Accordingly it is not surprising that the lack of agreement should extend to the bodies themselves.
South Africa and Germany should seek to break the impasse, take the initiative in devising a plan to rescue Zimbabwe, and seek to drive the process. The most propitious time for them to do so will be the first half of 2007. Because initiatives taken at the macro institutional level of the EU and SADC have failed owing to the diversity of members’ views, what is needed is to seek consensus between a few key countries in both the EU and SADC. The latter will be those that have the most to lose from the threatened implosion of Zimbabwe, namely South Africa, Mozambique and Botswana. As president of the EU, Chancellor Merkel should use her position to develop a common understanding with President Mbeki, based on the mutual concern of the two leaders for the long-term political and economic stability of Southern Africa.
If a common position is agreed between Chancellor Merkel and President Mbeki and a plan of action decided on, they will have commit themselves not only to a determined diplomatic initiative but a shared commitment to prioritise Zimbabwe’s affairs. One of the reasons why diplomatic efforts to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis have failed so far is that it has always featured as an addendum to, not the focus of, the diplomatic agenda that the EU and SADC share. In other words, it is going to take unwavering focus and political commitment on the part of both leaders to carry out the initiative. Their plan of action can then be used to build first a consensus between the EU and SADC, and then to gain the consent of the member states of both regional institutions.
The solution to both the humanitarian and economic crises in Zimbabwe is political
The impasse in Zimbabwe will not be broken if the root cause of the problem is not addressed. At its core is a crisis of governance. This in turn stems from the deeply flawed Lancaster House constitution, which was hurriedly agreed upon in the rush to bring an end to the country’s bloody war of liberation. It would be pointless to focus on the economic and humanitarian crises in Zimbabwe without addressing the fundamental need for a new democratic dispensation.
What Zimbabwe needs more than anything else now is a national consensus on how the country should be governed. That will happen only if Zimbabwe’s Southern African neighbours, backed by the international community, encourage all political players in Zimbabwe to embark on a constitutional reform process like that which ushered in a peaceful transition to democracy in South Africa. If the EU and SADC were to agree on such a course of action, and were prepared to exert strong pressure on all players within Zimbabwe to participate in such a process, many of the problems of Zimbabwe could be brought to a rapid end.
Whilst both ZANU-PF and the MDC are currently in disarray (the former has no succession plan and is seriously divided, while the latter has split), that situation should be viewed in a positive light. Despite the chaos, there are substantial majorities in both political formations that recognise the critical need for constitutional reform. Paradoxically the split in the opposition provides a unique opportunity, because it has lulled ZANU-PF into the belief that the opposition does not any longer pose a meaningful threat, and that therefore it can press ahead with its own version of constitutional reform. Even Mugabe’s expressed intention of extending his own term to 2010 can be exploited positively, because he can do this only by amending the constitution, which will entail reopening the constitutional reform debate. There are also serious reservations within ZANU-PF about whether Mugabe should be allowed to remain in office for so long. In short, the time is ripe for the international community to focus its attention on constitutional reform as the principal means of breaking the impasse in Zimbabwe.
However, given the urgency of the situation and Zanu-PF’s well-developed propensity for buying time, any attempt at bringing about real constitutional reform will work only if Southern African states bring pressure to bear on the Zimbabwean government to participate wholeheartedly in the process. Already there is a remarkable degree of agreement on what constitutional reforms are needed, and much work has already been done. Accordingly if this process were supported by both SADC and the EU it is not over-optimistic to assume that agreement on a new democratic constitution could be reached within a few months.
Free and fair elections that are compliant with the new constitution and the SADC electoral standards, overseen by SADC and the UN, and financially supported by the EU should follow agreement on the terms of a new constitution. The results of that election should be accepted by all parties (and SADC and the EU). Then economic assistance to stabilise the country should start to flow from abroad.
Only a political settlement that is accepted by all will yield a solution to the economic and humanitarian crises besetting Zimbabwe today.
Conclusion
The situation in Zimbabwe has deteriorated rapidly since 2000, causing tremendous loss of life. Conditions in the country now represent what is arguably the world’s greatest humanitarian challenge in 2007. The fact that Zimbabweans now have the lowest life expectancy in the world cannot be ignored any longer.
Vigorous action is required urgently. South Africa and Germany are probably the only countries in the world influential enough in both Europe and Africa to play this vital role. Sadly, though, the desperate needs of Zimbabwe do not occupy a prominent place on either country’s foreign policy agenda. It is high time that this is changed before the crisis reaches unmanageable proportions. Disaster in Zimbabwe will set back the entire Southern African region.
David Coltart
Bulawayo 30th January 2007
